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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's order summarily dismissing Shane McKay's 
application for post-conviction relief 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
At approxin~ately midnight on October 3,2003, Mr. McKay was driving a vehicle 
westbound on a two lane road. See Tr. (31652)' pg. 144-46. Some distance ahead, two 
motorcycles also traveled in the westbound lane. Id. Mr. Cox drove one motorcycle and his 
friends, Mike and Mike's girlfriend Monique, rode on the second bike. Tr. (31652) pg. 180-81. 
The motorcycles approached railroad tracks and slowed to 5 to 10 mph. Tr. (31652) pg. 240, In. 
17-21. Mr. McKay approached the tracks when Mr. Cox's motorcycle "popped out of nowhere" 
and Mr. McKay's vehicle struck its rear. Tr. (31652) pg. 484, In. 22-23, pg. 486, in. 11-13. Mr. 
Cox died as a result of the impact. Tr. (31652) pg. 548-49. A sample of Mr. McKay's blood 
demonstrated a blood alcohol content (BAC) o f .  15 approxiinately one and half hours following 
the accident. Tr. (31652) pg. 504, In. 24-25. The state charged Mr. McKay with felony vehicular 
manslaughter, I.C. § 18-4006(3)(b), alleging that his commission of a Driving Under the 
Influence (DUI) offense caused Mr. Cox's death. R. (31652), p. 18-19. 
Mr. McKay's trial counsel theorized that the taillight on Mr. Cox's motorcycle was either 
' Contemporaneously with this brief, Mr. McKay files a request that this Court take 
judicial notice of the record and transcript in Mr. McKay's direct appeal, Supreme Court Docket 
Number 31652. For ease of reference, citations to the appellate records and transcripts are 
accompanied by their respective docket numbers. 
1101 present or nonoperational and, therefore, the motorcycle was not visible to Mr. McKay. See 
R. (34271), p. 122. Thus, because the non-visibility of the motorcycle instead of Mr. McKay's 
impaired driving caused the accident, Mr. McKay's unlawful conduct did not cause Mr. Cox's 
death within the meaning of 1.C. S 18-4006(3)(b). Id. 
At trial, an officer who investigated the accident testified that he searched the accident 
scene and Mr. McKay's vehicle but was unable to find any sign, such as broken glass or pieces of 
the taillight housing, that there had been a taillight on Mr. Cox's motorcycle. Tr. (31652) pg. 
407, In 15 to pg. 408, In. 22. An accident reconstructionist presented by Mr. McKay similarly 
testified that he inspected Mr. McKay's vehicle closely and was unable to find any remnants of a 
taillight embedded in Mr. McKay's vehicle. Tr. (31652) pg. 705. p. 8-14. Mike and Monique 
testified that they observed Mr. Cox's taillight operating prior to the accident. Tr. (31652), pg. 
175, In. 23-25,214, in. 1-3. However, Mike and Monique also testified that, although they 
traveled to several bars with Mr. Cox, no one consumed any alcohol except for Mr. Cox, who 
had one shot. SeeTr. (31652) pg. 210 to pg. 211, In. 17, pg. 215, In. 13-14. An analysis of Mr. 
Cox's blood nonetheless demonstrated a BAC of .19. Tr. (31652) pg. 556, 18-23. 
Mr. McKay requested a jury instruction that informed the jury that the state must prove 
that Mr. McKay committed a DUI and "the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful manner 
caused the death of [Mr. Cox]." R. (34271), pg. 85. Mr. McKay's requested instruction was 
similar to Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (ICJI) 709, which instructs that a defendant is guilty if 
his "operation of the motor vehicle in such unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing 
to the death of [the decedent]." The district court deviated from the pattern instructions and 
proposed to instruct the jury that Mr. McICay was guilty if the state proved that Mr. McKay 
committed a DUI and that his "operation of the motor vehicle caused the death of [Mr. Cox]." R. 
(34271), pg. 68. At the jury instruction conference, Mr. Harris indicated "we have talked briefly 
about cause, and the dilemma is what to do about cause. And 1 have essentially talten the 
position that cause is something that I'm not requesting a jury [instruction] on this morning, but 
it's certainly part of the dilemma." R. (34271), pg. 110. 
The jury found Mr. McICay guilty of felony vehicular manslaughter. R. (31652), pg. 212. 
The district court sentenced Mr. McKay to a unified term of ten years with a minimum period of 
confinement of four years. R. (31652), pg. 225. Mr. McKay filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for 
reduction of his sentence, which the district court denied. R. (31652), pg. 265. Mr. McKay 
appealed from the sentence and the denial of his Rule 35 motion. R. (31652), pg. 261. Appellate 
counsel filed a brief arguing that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive 
sentence and by denying Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion. Court file (3 1652). Ln an unpublished 
opinion, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. McKay's sentence. See State v. McKay, 
Docket No. 31652 (Ct. App. Nov. 22,2006). 
2. Post-Conviction Proceedings 
On Ja~luary 19, 2007, Mr. McKay filed an application for post-conviction relief alleging 
that he received ineffective assistance of appellate and trial counsel. R. (34271), pg. 2. Mr. 
McKay alleged that the vehicular manslaughter jury instruction failed to instruct regarding the 
element of cause because it omitted the clarification, found in the Idaho Criminal Jury 
Instructions, that the defendants' operation of a motor vehicle in an unlawful manner must have 
been a significant cause of the death. R. (34271), pg. 13-28. Mr. McKay contended that trial 
counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the district court's jury instructions, which 
failed to require the state to prove Mr. McKay's commission of a DUI caused Mr. Cox's death, 
and that he was prejudiced by the jury instructions because the element of cause was at issue in 
his trial. Id. Mr. McKay also alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance 
because there was a reasonable probability that, if appellate counsel had raised the jury 
instruction error, he would have prevailed on direct appeal. R. (342711, pg. 20-28. 
The state moved for summary dismissal alleging that the jury instruction's deviation from 
the patte~n instructions benefitted Mr. McKay, that the jury was properly instructed and that Mr. 
McKay received effective assistance of counsel. R. (34271), pg. 137-39. Mr. McKay filed a 
response to the state's motion and a cross-motion asserting that he was entitled to summary 
disposition. R. (342711, pg. 224-232. At oral argument on the motions for summary dismissal, 
the state conceded that the vehicular manslaughter jury instruction differed fro111 the pattern 
instnictions approved by the Supreme Court but maintained that the deviation did not harm Mr. 
McKay. Tr. (34271), pg. 5, In. 11-15. 
The district court found that omission of the word "significant" placed a higher burden on 
the state and, therefore, trial and appellate counsels' failure to object to that instruction did not 
prejudice Mr. McKay. Tr. (342711, pg. 29, in. 15-23. Without addressing Mr. McKay's 
arguments with regard to the omission of the "in such unlawful," the district court granted the 
state's motion for summary dismissal. See Tr. (34271), pg. 30, in. 17-19. This timely appeal 
follows. 
111. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. McKay's post-conviction 
application because the jury instructions omitted the element of cause and that element was at 
issue? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the 
applicant is required to prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. McKeeth v. 
State, 140 Idaho 847, 849, 103 P.3d 460,462 (2004); Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933,935, 120 
P.3d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 2005). Summary dismissal of a post-conviction action, either upon 
motion of the court or the state, is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the 
requested relief. Goociwin v. Stc~te, 138 Idaho 269,272,61 P.3d 626,629 (Ct. App. 2002). If 
such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Sparks, 140 Idaho at 
295, 92 P.3d at 545. 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary 
hearing, this Court determines whether the pleadings, depositions, admissions and any affidavits 
demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact. Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433,438, 163 
P.3d 222,227 (Ct. App. 2007). The Court must liberally constnle the facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Knutsen, 144 Idaho at 438, 163 P.3d at 227; Ricca v. 
State, 124 Idaho 894, 896, 865 P.2d 985,987 (Ct. App. 1993). 
B. The District Court Erred by Summarily Dismissing Mr. McKay's Application for 
Post-Conviction Relief Because the Jury Instructions Failed to Instruct Regarding 
the Element of Cause and That Element Was at Issue in Mr. McKay's Trial 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the 
post-conviction procedure act. Martinez v. State, 143 Idaho 789,795, 152 P.3d 1237, 1243 
(Ct. App. 2007); Murray v State, 121 Idaho 918,924-25,828 P.2d 1323,1329-30 (Ct. App. 
1992). A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of connsel will prevail if he shows that (1) 
counsel's performance was deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the 
defendant. Stricliland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A defendant meets the 
deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Mitchell v. Stale, 132 Idaho 274,277,971 P.2d 727,730 (1998); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758,760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The prejudice prong is met when the 
defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; 
Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277,971 P.2d at 730. 
In this case, the district court concluded that any error in the vehicular manslaughter jury 
instruction benefitted instead of harmed Mr. McIQay and, therefore, neither trial nor appellate 
counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to argue that the district court erred in so 
instructing the jury. However, the vehicular manslaughter jury instruction misstated the law, 
misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. McKay. Accordingly, Mr. McKay received ineffective 
assistance of trial and appellate counsel and the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. 
McKay's post-conviction application. 
1. Trial counsel performed deficiently 
Whether trial counsel performed in an objectively unreasonable manner by failing to 
object to jury instructions depends on whether the instructions contained errors.' See Brown v. 
' In the proceedings before the district court, the state argued that Mr. McKay should be 
precluded from arguing that the jury instructions were erroneous in post-conviction proceedings 
because the claim could have been presented on direct appeal. The district court's error in 
6 
State, 137 Idaho 529,533, 50 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2002). Whether the jury has been 
properly instructed is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State v. 
Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616,619, 130 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 2005); Brown, 137 Idaho at 533, 50 
P.3d at 1028. 
The Idaho Supreme Court approved the ICJI and recommended that the trial courts use 
the pattern instructions unless a different instruction would more adequately, accurately, or 
clearly state the law. State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 514, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005); 
State v. Cuevas-Hernandez, 140 Idaho 373,376,93 P.3d 704,707 (Ct. App. 2004). A trial court 
that deviates from the approved instructions, as the district court did in this case, does so at 
considerable risk that the verdict of guilty will be overlurned on appeal. See State v. Mewin, 
131 Idaho 642,647,962 P.2d 1026, 1031 (1998). 
Jury instructions are viewed as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury 
was properly and adequately instructed on the applicable law. State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 
65, 844 P.2d 691,694 (1992); Nevarez, 142 Idaho at 619, 130 P.3d at 1157. Nevertheless, an 
error in one instruction cannot be cured by reference to a correct statement of the law in another 
and, thus, an error is prejudicial when contradictory jury instructions are given on a material 
issue. Nevarez, 142 Idaho at 619, 130 P.3d at 1157; Strrte v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629,634, 51 
P.3d 443,448 (Ct. App. 2002). An instructional error entitles a defendant to relief when it 
misleads the jury or prejudices the defendant. Brown, 137 Idaho at 533, 50 P.3d at 1028; State v. 
instructing the jury is not a basis for post-conviction relief. Brown, 137 Idaho at 533 n.2, 50 P.3d 
at 1028 n.2. Nevertheless, Mr. McKay's claim that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to 
object to erroneous jury instructions is entirely proper in a post-conviction action. See id. at 533, 
50 P.3d at 1028. Alternatively, Mr. McKay argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the erroneous jury instruction on direct appeal. 
ITanson, 130 Idaho 842,844,949 P.2d 590,592 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Here, the district court not only failed to give the pattern instructions but, also, gave an 
instruction that misstated the law with regard to the cause element of vehicular manslaughter. 
The state was required to prove not only that Mr. McKay committed a DUI and the operation of 
his vehicle caused a death but, also, that it was his commission of the DUI that was a significant 
cause of the accident resulting in death. See State v. Thomas, 128 Idaho 906,908,920 P.2d 927, 
929 (Ct. App. 1996). Consistent with this concept, ICJI 709 indicates that, "in order for the 
defendant to be guilty of Vehicular Manslaughter, the state must prove the defendant . . . while 
operating a motor vehicle committed the unlawful act o f .  . . driving while under the influence of 
alcohol . . . and . . . the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in such unlal.vful manner was a 
signiJicant cause contributing to the death of [the decedent]" (emphasis added). Conversely, the 
district court instructed the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty of vehicular manslaughter if i t  
concluded he "drove or was in actual physical control o f .  . . a motor vehicle . . . while under the 
influence of alcohol or [with a BAC of more than ,081 and [his] operation of the motor vehicle 
caused the death of [Mr. Cox]." R. (34271) 68. 
The district court acknowledged that its jury instructions deviated from the pattern 
instruction but nonetheless concluded that the variation benefitted, rather than harmed, Mr. 
McKay. In concluding that the deviations from the pattern instructions placed a higher burden on 
the state, the district court relied on 1997 amendments to I.C. 9 18-4006, in which the legislature 
changed "caused" to "a significant cause contributing to the death." Tr. (34271), p. 28, in. 4-8; 
1997 Idaho Session Laws Ch. 103, 5 1. The statement of purpose for this amendment indicates 
that: 
this legislation is intended to clarify the definition of vehicular manslaughter 
contained in Idaho Code, Section 18-4006. The statute as it presently reads has 
created confusion and resulted in inconsistent interpretations amongst trial judges 
as weii as juries. The proposed change will make it clear that driving under the 
influence may stilt result in a finding of guilt for vehicular manslaughter even 
tl~ough other causes, such as weather or lighting, may have in some way 
contributed to a motor vehicle accident which resulted in death. 
Idaho Session Laws Ch. 103, 5 1. The district court reasoned that the "change in the law shows 
that the legislature intended for the statute to be easier to prove in court and create a lower 
standard than it had in 1996." Tr. (34271), p. 28, In. 4-8. The district court therefore concluded 
that Mr. McICay's ineffective assistance of counsel claims failed as a matter of law because Mr. 
McKay benefitted from trial counsel's failure to object to any error in the jury instructions. Tr. 
(34271), pg. 29, in. 15-23. 
The district court's conclusion is incorrect because both the omission of the phrase "in 
such unlawful manner" and of the word "significant" resulted in instructions that misstated the 
law, misled the jury and prejudiced Mr. McKay. Initially, the district court focused on the 
absence of "significant" and failed to address the impact of the omission of "in such unlawful 
manner." The vehicular manslaughter charge required the state to prove that Mr. McKay's 
operation of a motor vehicle caused Mr. Cox's death because he "was driving in an unlawful 
manner, specifically, under the influence of alcohol." See Thomas, 128 Idaho at 908, 920 P.2d at 
929. If Mr. Cox's taillight was nonoperational and the motorcycle was not visible to Mr. McKay, 
then the accident would have occurred regardless of any impaired driving and Mr. McKay's 
intoxication was not a significant factor contributing to Mr. Cox's death. A motorist cannot yield 
to what he cannot see.' State v. Brown, 603 N.W.2d 456,461 (Neb. 1999). In Miller v. State, 
513 S.E.2d 27, 30-3 l (Ga. Ct. App. 1999), the defendant struck a bicycle with his vehicle and an 
analysis of his blood revealed a BAC of .17. The trial court's re-instruction to the jury was 
reversible error because it could have left the jury with the mistaken notion that a defendant's 
intoxicated driving need only be a cause or an indirect cause of the death and could have 
deprived the defendant of his defense that, even if driving under the influence, that conduct was 
not the proximate cause of the death. Miller, 5 13 S.E.2d at 32. 
The phrase "in such unlawful manner," which is found in SCJI 709 and absent from the 
district court's instn~ction, clarifies that a defendant is not guilty of vehicular manslaughter 
unless his culpable conduct caused a death. The on~ission of this phrase permitted the jury to 
find Mr. McICay guilty notwithstanding its conclusion that the motorcycle was not visible to Mr. 
McSCay and that the accideilt would have occurred regardless of whether Mr. McKay was driving 
under the influence. 
The 1997 amendment relied on by the district court had no bearing on the phrase "such 
unlawful conduct" found in the pattern instruction and omitted from the instructions given in this 
case. By omitting that phrase, the jury was not required to link Mr. McKay's culpable conduct 
with the death of Mr. Cox and the state was relieved of its burden to prove every element of the 
' In argument to the district court, the state indicated that it didn't "see any similarity 
between the laws in Georgia and Nebraska and Washington" and Idaho. Tr. (34271), pg. 5, In 1- 
6. Although phrased differently, the vehicular homicide statutes in those states each define the 
crime as occuning when a person unintentionally causes a death through the commission of a 
DUI. See Ga. Code Ann. 5 40-6-393; I.C. § 18-4006; Neb. Rev. St. $28-306; R.C.W.A. 
46.61.520. The concepts set forth in the out-of-state cases Mr. McKay cited to in this brief and 
in the proceedings before the district court are consistent with Thomas, I.C. § 18-4006 and ICJS 
709 and, thus, are persuasive authority for this Court's consideration. 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that vehicular manslaughter is a 
strict liability offense, which it is not, and the jury instruction therefore misstated the law and 
misled the jury. 
Omission of the word "significant" further exacerbated the error in omitting the phrase 
"in such unlawf~il manner." The concept of "significant cause" embodies the rule that to 
constitute vehicular homicide there must be a causal connection between the death and the 
defendant's driving so that the act was a proximate cause of the resulting death. See Wash. 
Pattern Jury Instructions Crim 90.07; Miller, 513 S.E. 2d at 30. In vehicular manslaughter cases, 
the deceased's conduct is relevant to whether the defendant's culpable conduct was the 
proximate cause of the death. Miller, 5 13 S.E.2d at 30-31. Even though contributory negligence 
is not a defense to vehicular manslaughter, an intoxicated defendant can avoid responsibility for a 
death resulting iiom the defendant's driving if the death was caused by a superseding event. 
State v. Souther. 998 P.2d 350, 355 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
The state argued, and the district court agreed, that omission of the word "significant" 
resulted in a higher standard of proof by requiring the state to prove that Mr. McKay's operation 
of the motor vehicle was the sole cause of the accident. See Tr. (34271) pg. 6 ,  in. 13-18. 
According to the state, the verb "caused" could only be interpreted to mean Mr. McKay's 
operation of his vehicle was "the cause" of Mr. Cox's death. See Tr. (34271) pg. 6 ,  in. 13 to pg. 
9, In. 8. However, the legislature amended the vehicular manslaughter statute because the phrase 
"the operation of the motor vehicle caused" had created "confusion and resulted in inconsistent 
interpretations amongst trial judges as well as juries." Idaho Session Laws Ch. 103, 5 1. The 
state's interpretation of "caused" is but one interpretation to language that the legislature 
amended because it gave rise to inconsistent interpretations. Thus, the jury could have 
interpreted "caused" to mean "a cause" and that interpretation permitted the july to find Mr. 
McKay guilty if i t  concluded his operation ofthe motor vehicle was a factor contributing to the 
cause of death. 
In instructing the jury, the district court deviated from the pattern instnictions by omitting 
the phrase "in such unlawful manner" and the word "significant." As a result, the jury was 
permitted to find Mr. McICay guilty of vehicular manslaughter notwithstanding the conclusion 
that his commission o f a  DUI was not a significant cause of Mr. Cox's death. Because the jury 
instruction was not a correct statement of the law, trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to 
object. 
2. Mr. McKay was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance 
Mr. McKay was prejudiced by the jury instruction, which omitted the element of cause, 
unless the guilty verdict "was surely unattributable to the error." See State v. Thompson, 143 
Idaho 155, 158, 139 P.3d 757,760 (Ct. App. 2006), citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
279 (1993). A defendant is prejudiced when a jury is not instructed as to an element of an 
offense and the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in favor of the 
defendant with respect to the omitted element. Neder v. Unitedstates, 527 U.S.  1, 19 (1999); 
Thompson, 143 Idaho at 158,139 P.3d at 760. Therefore, a defendant meets ihe prejudice prong 
when an essential element of the offense is at issue and counsel perfollns deficiently by 
acquiescing to an instruction that removes that element from the jury's consideration. State v. 
Gittins, 129 Idaho 54,58,921 P.2d 754, 758 (Ct. App. 1996). 
In this case, evidence was introduced that could have rationally led the jury to find that 
the motorcycle did not have a taillight and, because it is not possible to yield to what can not be 
seen, Mr. McKay's being under the influence did not cause Mr. Cox's death. Despite thorough 
searches for signs of Mr. Cox's taillight, no sign of the taillight, housing or assembly was found 
at the scene of the accident or on Mr. McKay's vehicle. Tr. 407, in 15 to pg. 408, in. 22., pg. 
705. p. 8-14. The evidence demonstrated that Mr. Cox "barely idl[ed] over the tracks." Tr. 
(31652) pg. 217, In. 23-24; see also pg. 181, in. 16-20, pg. 217, in. 15-17, pg. 240, in. 17-21. 
The officer who spolce with Mr. McKay at the scene of the accident testified that Mr. McKay 
indicated the motorcycle "popped out of nowhere" and that he was looking forward and "boom 
there [the motorcycle] was." Tr. (31652) pg. 484, In. 22-23, pg. 486, In. 11-13. The evidence 
also showed that Mr. McKay did not brake prior to impact. Tr. (31652) 634, in. 17-18. Thus, the 
evidence established that Mr. McKay did not see the motorcycle before the accident. When 
asked his opinion regarding the cause of the accident, Mr. McKay's reconstn~ctionist estified 
that he did not believe the moto'rcycle had a taillight on and "you obviously can't expect a vehicle 
to yield to something they can't see." Tr. (31652) pg. 706, In. 14-16. 
Additionally, the credibility of Mr. Cox's friends, Mike and Monique, who testified that 
they observed the operational taillight, was highly suspect. Mike and Monique testified that, 
with the exception of one shot taken by Mr. Cox, none of the group had consumed alcohol. See 
Tr. (3 1652) pg. 210 to pg. 21 1, In. 17, pg. 215, In. 13-14. Mike testified that he was very close 
with Mr. Cox and had never known him to drink. Tr. (31652) pg. 208, in. 6-19, pg. 21 1, in. 3 to 
pg. 212, In. 6. However, an analysis of Mr. Cox's blood demonstrated a BAC of .19, which not 
only established Mr. Cox had more than one shot, it also suggested that Mr. Cox had a tolerance 
for alcohol. Tr. (31652) pg. 556, 18-23. Mike testified that Mr. Cox "was [his] brother." Tr. 
(3 1652) pg. 208,111. 9. Another fiiend of Mr. Cox testified that he, Mike and Ted belonged to a 
brotherhood in which members are "there for each other." Tr. (31652) 283, In. 12-16, One 
witness testified that Mike had told her that he and Ted had spent the day of the accident drinking 
and had been stopped 011 the railroad tracks tallting at the time Mr. McKay's vehicle struck Mr. 
Cox. Tr. (31652) pg. 660, In. 11-16,663, in. 1-10. There was also evidence that Mr. Cox's 
motorcycle had been damaged a few weeks before accident. Tr. (31652) pg. 286-87, In. 23-10. 
Further, the erroneous jury instruction precluded the jury from acquitting Mr. McKay if it 
found Mr. Cox was not visible to Mr. McKay. During closing argument, trial counsel argued 
that Mr. McKay was not guilty if he committed a DUI and a death occurred but, rather, the law 
required the jury to conclude that the operation of the vehicle and the commission of the 
unlawful act caused a death. R. (34271) 202, pg. 36. Unfortunately, trial counsel's argument 
was inconsistent with the jury instructions, which did not require the jury to find that Mr. 
McKay's t~nlclwful operation of the vehicle caused Mr. Cox's deat11.~ Additionally, the 
prosecutor reiterated to the jury, consistent with the erroneous jury instruction, that Mr. McICay 
was guilty if he committed a DUI and a death resulted. R. (34271) p. 207, pg. 55. 
Sufficient evidence was introduced at trial from which the jury could have found that Mr. 
Cox did not have an operational taillight and that Mr. McKay's commission of DUl did not cause 
Mr. Cox's death. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that iEthe jury had been properly 
instructed regarding the element of cause, Mr. McKay would have been acquitted. 
"Trial counsel's argument additionally demonstrates that, even if a decision to lesser the 
state's burden of proof could ever be deemed sound trial strategy, trial counsel's failure to object 
to the erroneous jury instruction in this case was not a strategic decision. 
3. Appellate counsel 
Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-852, a criminal dcfcndant is guaranteed the right to 
effective assistance of counsel during any appeal. See Hernandez v. Stnte, 127 Idaho 685, 687, 
905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
states to ensure that an indigent appellant receive effective assistance of counsel on his first 
appeal of right from a judgment of conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Appellate counsel is required 
to make a conscientious examination of tbc case and file a brief in support of the best arguments 
to be made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v. 
State, 130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App.1997). 
As a general matter, courts will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and 
tactical choices. State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546, 551, 21 P.3d 483,488 (2001). However, this 
rule does not apply to counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. A post- 
conviction applicant can overcome the presumption of effective assistance by showing that the 
ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented. See Smith v. Robhim, 528 U.S. 259,288 
(2000); Mintun v. State, - Idaho -, -7 168 P.3d 40,45 (Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied 
September 14, 2007. 
Here, appellate counsel perfonned deficiently by failing to argue that the vehicular 
manslaughter instruction constituted fundamental error, which was the best argument to be made. 
Mr. McKay acknowledges that in Mintun, the Court of Appeals held that appellate counsel may 
not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim of fundamental error on an issue that was 
not preserved by objection in the trial court. Mintun, - Idaho at -, 168 P.3d at 46. 
Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, Mintun should either be overruled or distinguished 
from this case. 
An appellate decision should be overruled if it is manifestly wrong or overruling is 
necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. State v. 
Wntts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). In determining that an appellate counsel 
claim cannot lie for failing to raise a nonpreserved issue, the Court noted that "the allowance of 
this type of claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to 
protect a defendant's rights because the defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the 
trial proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the 
alleged en-or in the trial court." Mintun, - Idaho at -, 168 P.3d at 46. However, this "one 
or the other" approach is unfair to criminal defendants. A criminal defendant is entitled to an 
appeal following the conviction, including the appointment of counsel. Conversely, post- 
collviction relief, as a separate, civil proceeding, is not an entitlement and, thus, criminal 
defendants are not officially informed the right exists or given an attorney. The pro se post- 
conviction applicant is forced to draft an application on his owl1 witbin a deadline he is not 
formally informed of and hope the petition is good enough to secure the appointment of an 
attorney. As occurred in Mintun, a post-conviction attorney might not challenge trial counsel's 
failure to object to an error, leaving the criminal defendant whose appellate attorney left the issue 
for post-conviction without the opportunity to have a court hear the argument. 
The blanket rule is also inconsistent with Strickland. Whether trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to trial error is distinct from whether the error went to the 
foundation or base of a defendant's rights, such that it could be considered on direct appeal 
notwithstanding the lack of objection. The latter issue focuses on the magnitude of the violation 
and the impact it had on the defendant's trial and does not require development o f a  factual 
record regarding the trial attorney's reasons for failing to object. While the failure of trial 
counsel to object to non-fundamental error should and must be raised in post-conviction, 
fundamental error can and should be raised on direct appeal irrespective of trial counsel's failure 
to object. Failing to raise a meritorious issue on appeal is ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, in-espective of whether the issue was preserved by trial counsel or only reviewable under 
the fundamental error doctrine. Trial counsel could potentially be found ineffective for failing to 
object to an error that, although not f~~ndamental, was one that a reasonable attorney would have 
objected to and that he was prejudiced by the failure to object because the error was not harmless. 
F~~rthermore, the appellant whose counsel does not raise fundamental error loses the 
benefit of a more favorable standard of review on direct appeal, e.g. the Chapman standard of 
finding constitutional harmless error on appeal, because the burden of proof and persuasion shifts 
to the petitioner in post-conviction proceedings. Therefore, Mintun should be overruled. 
Alternatively, Mintun is distinguishable and should not be applied in this case. In holding 
that counsel cannot be deficient for failing to raise nonpreserved issues on appeal, the Court 
reasoned that there is no bright line delineating categories of errors that are fundamental and, 
thus, counsel would be forced to raise all potential errors. Mintun, - Idaho at -9 168 P.3d 
at 46. Unlike Mintun, this case involves a jury instruction that failed to require the state to prove 
that Mr. McKay's culpable conduct was the significant cause of a death. The requirement that 
the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the 
constitutional guarantee of due process. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993); 
State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43,47, 13 P.3d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App. 2000). A jury instruction 
violates due process if it fails to require the state to prove every element of the offense. 
Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433,437 (2004). A jury instructio~~ that omits an element of an 
offense constitutes fundamental error, which is reviewahle for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Anderson, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 33827,2007 WL 3052862 (October 22, 2007). 
The Court also reasoned that the record may not he fully developed on direct appeal and a 
trial attorney may have legitimate strategic reasons for failing to object to potential errors. 
Mintun, - Idaho at -, 168 P.3d at 46. However, whether the jury has been properly 
instructed is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 
at 619,130 P.3d at 1157; Brown, 137 Idaho at 533,50 P.3d at 1028. Further, there can be no 
sound strategic reason for not holding the state to its burden to pl-ove each of the elements of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt and, thus, factual development of trial counsel's reasons for 
failing to object is unnecessary. 
Moreover, appellate counsel in Mintun filed an adequate brief. Mintun, Idaho at 
-, 168 P.3d at 44. Conversely, in this case, appellate counsel argued that the district court 
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion for 
reduction in sentence. In order to show that the sentence imposed was unreasonable, and thus an 
abuse of the court's discretion, the defendant must show that the sentence, in light of the 
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Al-Kotrani, 141 
Idaho 66,70, 106 P.3d 392,396 (2005). Such challenges are rarely successfU1. See Al-Kotrani, 
141 Idaho at 71, 106 P.3d at 397; State v. Calley, 140 Idaho 663,666,99 P.3d 616, 619 (2004); 
State v. .Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782,787 (2002); State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 
462, 50 P.3d 472,477 (2002); State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 897,980 P.2d 552, 561 (1999). 
On April 3,2006, appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the appellate record and 
suspend the briefing schedule. K. (34271) p. 233. Appellate counsel asked that the jury 
instructions, proposed jury instnictious, and transcripts of opening and closing arguments and 
jury instruction conference augment the record. Id. at p. 233-34. Appellate counsel contended 
that the vehicular manslaughter jury instn~ction misstated the law and that he intended to raise 
the error as an issue on appeal. Id at 234. The Court granted appellate counsel's motion and 
s~ispended the briefing schedule until the record had been augmented. Id. at 239. 
Nevertheless, appellate counsel failed to raise the jury instruction error as an issue on 
appeal and, on September 20, 2006, filed a brief arguing that the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing an excessive sentence and denying the Rule 35 motion. Court file 31652. 
Even if appellate counsel detem~ined Mr. McKay was unlikely to prevail on the jury instn~ction 
issue, that argument still maintained a better chance of success than the challenge to the sentence 
and the district court's denial of Mr. McKay's Rule 35 motion. See e.g. Anderson, Idaho 
S~ipreme Court Docket No. 33827, 2007 WL 3052862. Accordingly, there could be no strategic 
reason to forgo the jury instruction argument and appellate counsel's performance is not entitled 
to a presumption of correctness. At the least, Mr. McKay is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
the question. 
Moreover, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise the 
erroneous jury instruction on direct appeal. As discussed above, Mr. McKay was prejudiced by 
the omission of instructions describing the essential elements of the charged offense. Because 
the district court deviated from the jury instructions previously approved by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, there was considerable risk that the verdict finding Mr. McKay guilty would have been 
overturned on appeal. See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 647,962 P.2d at 103 1. The failure to instruct 
the jury on all the elements of a criminal offense also violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial. See Sullivcin, 508 U.S. at 277-78. Accordingly, there is a reasonable 
probability that, had the jury instntction issue been raised, the result of Mr. McKay's direct 
appeal would have been different. 
4. Conclusion 
The vehicular manslaughter jury instruction deviated from the pattern instructions 
approved by the Idaho Supreme Court by omitting the phrase "in such unlawful manner" and the 
word "significant." As a result of these omissions, the jury was not required to link Mr. McKay's 
unlawful conduct with Mr. Cox's death. Moreover, evidence was introduced at trial, which 
could have rationally led the jury to conclude that Mr. Cox's motorcycle was not visible to Mr. 
McKay and, thus, that his comnlission of a DUI was not a significant cause contributing to Mr. 
Cox's death. The district court therefore erred in concluding that the vehicular manslaughter jury 
instruction benefitted Mr. McKay and that neither trial nor appellate counsel provided ineffective 
assistance by failing to challenge that instruction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. McKay respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district court's order dismissing 
his application for post-conviction relief and remand with instnlction either to grant Mr. McKay 
the relief requested in his application or to conduct an evidentiary hearing. 
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